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* Departamento de Economía - Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República Abstract 
This paper assesses the willingness to justify illegal actions and whether this attitude has 
changed between 1995 and 2005. Our dataset are 1995 and 2005 waves of World Values 
Survey.   
 
Permissiveness or the willingness to justify illegal actions is a cultural phenomenon that 
can be defined in several ways depending on societies and people. Hence, we consider 
firstly the four dimensions available (accepting bribes, evading taxes, etc.), and we 
estimated multivariate regressions. Secondly, from principal component analysis, we 
generated a new variable "willingness to justify” as a weighted average of the previous 
dimensions. 
 
We find that socio-demographic variables such as age and education reduce 
permissiveness,  political affiliation with the Center hikes it, being employed full time 
reduces permissiveness while income has the opposite effect, even when religiosity 
reduces permissiveness, beliefs in God do not matter, living in Montevideo reduces 
permissiveness and finally, between 1995 and 2005 the permissiveness among Uruguayans 
has changed, the model show that the probability of being permissive is significantly 
higher in 2005 than in 1995. 
 
Key words: permissiveness, illegal action, microeconomic behavior, Uruguay. 
JEL Classification: A13, D01, D73, K42. 
 
Resumen 
Este trabajo analiza la disposición a justificar ciertas acciones ilícitas y sí esta actitud ha 
cambiado entre los años 1995 y 2005. Los microdatos utilizados corresponden a dos olas 
de la Encuesta Mundial de Valores realizada en esos años.  
 
Esta disposición a justificar acciones ilícitas es un fenómeno cultural que puede ser 
definido de diversas formas según cada sociedad e individuo. Por lo tanto, en primera lugar 
se analizan las distintas dimensiones consideradas en la encuesta (aceptar un soborno, 
evadir impuestos, etc.), y estimamos regresiones multivariadas; en la segunda, a partir del 
análisis de componentes principales se generó la variable “disposición a justificar” como 
promedio ponderado de las dimensiones analizadas.  
 
Se encuentra que: variables socio-demográficas como la edad y la educación reducen la 
disposición del individuo a ser permisivo, la afiliación política con el Centro aumenta la 
permisividad, variables económicas como trabajar a tiempo completo reduce la 
permisividad mientras que se reduce al aumentar el nivel de ingresos del hogar, el lugar de 
residencia juega un rol muy importante, los montevideanos tienen menor probabilidad de 
justificar una acción ilícita que el resto de los uruguayos y por último, entre los años 1995 
y 2005 las actitudes han cambiado, es posible afirmar que la probabilidad de ser permisivo 
es significativamente mayor en el año 2005. 
 
Palabras claves: permisividad, acción ilegal, comportamiento microeconómico, Uruguay. 
Clasificación JEL: A13, D01, D73, K42. 
 1.  Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we assess what are the significant characteristics 
that shape the willingness to justify a set of illegal actions in the case of Uruguay. Second, 
we analyze whether there is a change in Uruguayans´ attitudes between 1995 and 2005. 
Our starting point is the acceptance that this attitude is a cultural phenomenon. Whether the 
acceptance of rules and laws differ among people depends on their characteristics (such as 
education or moral values), we should ask: what are the individual characteristics that 
shape the willingness to justify an illegal action? or what factors determine 
permissiveness? 
 
Cábelková (2001) studies the incentives to take an illegal action and she holds that this 
phenomenon is affected by individual perception about the level of occurrence of these 
events and the authority’s level of tolerance. Both levels could affect the demand and 
supply of illegal actions. Given this objective factors (level of occurrence or tolerance) and 
when the fulfillment of rules is costly; the decision making process would vary depending 
on values and moral views because these non-objective elements play a relevant role in 
determining the expected costs and expected benefits. Ceteris paribus, to take an illegal 
action would not mean the same to people depending on their values and moral views. For 
example, while a person could be against bribery regardless of the perceived level of 
corruption someone else views could depend on the existing level of corruption. 
 
Our dataset are the World Values Surveys carried out in 1995 and 2005. Both surveys 
included a set of questions that allow us to identify the individual level of permissiveness. 
 
We find that there is a set of socio-demographic characteristics that play a relevant role in 
shaping the willingness to justify an illegal action (age and education reduced the intrinsic 
individual willingness to be permissive, while the affiliation with the Center and feelings 
such as patriotism increase it). Moreover, those who live in Montevideo are less likely to 
justify an illegal action. Finally, between 1995 and 2005 the attitudes of the population 
showed a relevant change, the probability to justify an illegal action is higher in 2006 than 
in 1996 and this difference is significant.  
 
  1The structure of the paper is as follows. The second section is theoretical in nature and it 
assesses the notions of tolerance, illegal actions and its most important interpretations. 
Section three is devoted to the existing theory on the subject. Section four sketches the 
main features of the econometric methods applied in this analysis, the data source and the 
description of variables. The fifth section deals with results. Finally, the conclusions are 
presented in section six. 
  
2.  What is meant by illegal action? 
 
The concepts of permissiveness and corruption as well as what we consider an illegal 
action vary not only among societies and in history but also depending on each individual. 
Indeed, social norms also vary, so that what in a given culture can be seen as an illegal 
conduct in another culture can be considered as a normal and an accepted behavior.  
 
For example, there are several definitions of corruption. Werlin (1973) characterizes 
corruption as the use of public office for making private gains and Blackburn et al. (2004) 
consider public sector corruption as the illegal, or unauthorized, profiteering by officials 
who exploit their positions to make personal gains. Focusing on public sector, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993), define it as the sale of state assets by civil servants in order to make gains. 
However, it is worth noting that even when there is no single definition of corruption; all 
of them included a common aspect: the misuse of public office with the purpose of making 
private gains.  
 
Maingot (1994) classifies the theories that explain illegal behavior at different levels. 
Firstly, those theories that are premised on cultural behavior: cultural explanations are very 
common in Latin America and tend to adhere to two well-established theories of criminal 
behavior, both emphasizing the socialization process. For example, the theory of cultural 
transmission maintains that offenders adhere to a unique value system which endorses, 
rather than condemns, the deviant behavior. This would mean that Latin American officials 
are corrupt because there exists a bifurcated moral sense in which corrupt behavior, while 
in office, is not only not condemned but, on the contrary, is actually approved. The second 
example is that of differential association: e.g., because of their intimate, small-group 
interaction and association with deviants, individuals engage in similar behavior. One often 
  2hears that because the big fish are "biting," one should naturally expect the smaller fry to 
"bite" also. 
 
Secondly, there are theoretical schools which emphasize social conflict or social strain 
explanations. According to Maingot (1994), this approach tends to be popular among more 
radical interpreters of the Latin American and Caribbean reality. It is assumed that, due to 
the obstacles to legitimate social mobility presented by the steeply stratified nature of its 
social structures, there is a propensity to resort to deviant means in order to achieve 
socially approved goals. 
 
Finally, there are theories which emphasize individual choice and focuses on the individual 
as a rational actor, one who makes utilitarian choices in a particular social and economic 
context. This theory focuses on the individual who, in contemplation of a corrupt act, is 
able to weigh rationally his moral scruples, fear of official sanctions and public disapproval 
on the one hand against the potential material gains and psychological gratifications 
provided by the act on the other. Evidently, while the desire for gain might be strong, the 
legal and moral context is subject to change and, thus, is able to alter the outcome of the 
calculation. This approach combines rational actor theory with more economic theories. 
Therefore, it enables us to understand why so many officials still opt for honesty even in 
the face of powerful, almost all-encompassing, pressures towards deviance and corruption. 
In that sense, Maingot (1994) argues that elements such as moral sentiments and fear of 
public disapproval must carry a powerful counter weight. 
 
3.  What are the elements that facilitate the occurrence of an illegal action? 
 
In general, if individuals believe that the illegal actions occur without offenders being 
punished; people perceive that it is “easier” to take an illegal action. For example, high 
levels of corruption perception have fostered the growth of institutional instability and the 
persistent erosion of relations among people, institutions and States. As it was mentioned, 
permissiveness is a cultural phenomenon which varies depending on societies, cultures and 
people. Accepting this fact, it is possible to assess the objective and subjective aspects that 
influence on the willingness to justify an illegal action. 
 
  3Cábelková (2001) studies the incentives to take illegal actions and she holds that this 
phenomenon is affected by individual perception about the level of occurrence and the 
authority’s level of tolerance. Both levels affect the demand and supply of these actions. 
Therefore, corruption perception is shaped by individual characteristics such as education 
and the capability to analyze information. As she indicates, the perception of occurrence of 
illegal actions may influence the actual level in two opposite ways.  
 
For example, when people perceive that the level of corruption is high it is likely that: 1) 
citizens think that a bribe is needed and 2) government employees do not consider that a 
bribe is improper. Consequently, a bribe is thought to be necessary, it seems unlikely that 
this bribe would not be accepted and civil servants consider that this activity is risk-free. 
Therefore, corruption may increase. On the other hand, when corruption is high, the 
government may take greater actions in order to reduce it and therefore, corruption could 
decrease. 
 
4.  Database and methodology 
 
The data source is the World Values Survey. We used two waves, the surveys carried out 
in 1995 and 2005. These surveys include economic and socio-demographic data and 
opinions on various issues (corruption, democracy, etc.). In particular, they include a set of 
questions to analyze the intrinsic willingness to justify an illegal action.  
 
The dependant variables were generated taking into account the following question: 
“please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be 
justified (10), never be justified (1), or something in between (from 2 to 8): 
1.  Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled. 
2.  Avoiding a fare on public transport. 
3.  Cheating on taxes if you have a chance. 
4.  Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties.” 
 
Insert TABLE 1: Weighted distribution of answers 
 
  4Table 1 shows that, in all cases, more than 55% of respondents indicated that the action is 
never justify. In addition, in both years, the lower level of permissiveness is found in case 
4 (90.95% and 74.52% answered that it was never justifiable).  
 
However, Uruguayans are more permissive in 2005 than in 1995. Table 1 also shows that 
the percentage of people who indicated number 1 (“it is never justifiable”) is, in all cases, 
lower in 2005 than in 1995. Furthermore, considering this category, it is worth noting that 
the highest variation is found in case 1 (that reaches 17.1 percentage points). 
 
As it was mentioned, the concept of permissiveness involves so many dimensions; 
therefore we estimated multivariate regressions taking into account the same set of 
independent variables. Moreover, with the aim of analyzing the individual determinants to 
justify an illegal action and given that each considered case describe a particular case of 
illegal action, from common factor analysis we construct a new continuous variable: 
“willingness to justify” as a weighted linear combination of the previous cases.  
 
Insert TABLE 2: Description of independent variables 
 
5.  Results 
 
Table 3 shows the estimated models. Given that we estimate linear regressions, the 
estimated coefficients provide direct information on the impact of each independent 
variable.  
 
Insert TABLE 3: Estimated models 
 
Firstly, we find no gender bias; in all cases the variable man is not significant. 
Traditionally men see the world in more competitive and conflictual terms, while women 
are more cooperative and nurturing (Smith, 1997). However, theses differences do not 
affect permissiveness. Secondly, the models show that, in general, age reduces 
permissiveness. Hence, regarding this attitude, there are life course adjustments. The 
highest impact could be found in regression 2. Moreover, age is not significant only in 
regression 4, only in the case of accepting a bribe there are no differences regarding age.  
  5Taking into account education, we find negative effects. However, the impacts are very 
different depending on the specific illegal action to be considered. This result could imply 
that access to information and the capability to process this information matter: more 
educated people have more information and better capabilities to process it. It is worth 
noting that the highest effect is found in the case of secondary. Finally, considering the 
composite variable "willingness to justify," we find the same effects that the impacts 
observed in regression 4.  
 
Regarding marital status, it is found that, in general, it does not play a significant role in 
determining this attitude. While it is possible to see divorce as just another miscellaneous 
negative life event, it makes no significant difference. Smith (1997) holds that divorce will 
have a distinct and especially strong impact on shaping judgments about human nature 
since it concerns broken commitments involving very close, interpersonal relationships. 
The exception is case 1 in which it is found that those who are married are less likely to 
justify this action. In addition the number of children, in general, does not impact on 
permissiveness. The exception is regression 3, in which those who have a child tend to be 
more permissive.  
 
Furthermore, the models show that religiosity matters in all cases with the exception of 
regression 4. This result implies that weekly attendance at religious services reduces 
permissiveness. On the other hand, beliefs in God do not affect permissiveness.  
 
The models also included variables linked with labor market. The models showed that 
unemployment does not influence on the willingness to justify an illegal action. However, 
being employed full time decreases the probability of being permissive (when it is 
significant). It might be possible that this group of people is exposed to more illegal 
actions. 
 
Moreover, according to the models, income is significant and the impact is positive, it 
makes people more permissive. According to Ghersi (2006) the cost of legality is inversely 
proportional to an individual’s income and in line with this You and Khagram (2005) show 
that income inequality is a significant determinant of corruption. With the increased 
inequality, the rich, as a class or as interest group, can use lobbying, political contributions 
  6or bribery to influence law-implementing processes and to buy favorable interpretations of 
the law. The authors add that “the rich are likely to believe that corruption is an acceptable 
way of preserving their societal position as this behavior goes unpunished and social 
networks of corruption expand” and people will more easily justify their corrupt activities 
as inequality increases. 
 
Regarding political affiliation, we find that there are significant differences among those 
who identify with the left, center or right. In both models, it is found that people who 
identifies with the center tend to be more permissive. Furthermore, attachment to the 
country also matter. In all cases, patriotism reduces permissiveness.  
 
It is worth noting, that the place of residence also is significant in shaping this attitude. In 
particular, we find that those who live in Montevideo tend to be less permissive.  
 
Finally, we find a significant change in attitudes between 1995 and 2005. The models show 
a significant increase in permissiveness between theses years (with the exemption of 
regression 2).  
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
We find that socio-demographic characteristics that play a relevant role in shaping the 
willingness to justify an illegal action. 
 
The estimated models show that age and in general, education reduces permissiveness. On 
the other hand, and in most cases, the number of children plays no significant role in 
shaping this attitude. Regarding attachment to the country (national pride), we find that 
those individuals who are proud of the country tend to be less permissive. Furthermore, 
political affiliation also matters, those people who identify with the center tend to be more 
permissive. On the other hand, there are no significant differences among those people 
who identify with the left and those who identify with the right. Moreover, we find that 
some of the variables linked with labor market also impact on permissiveness. Those 
employed full time tend to be less permissive while income level raises the probability of 
justifying an illegal action. On the contrary, unemployment does not influence in this 
  7attitude. In all cases, the place of residence has a significant effect. In particular, we find 
that those who live in Montevideo are less likely to justify an illegal action.  
 
Finally, we find that this attitude changed between 1995 and 2005. The results indicate that 
the probability to justify an illegal action is higher in 2005. Therefore, Uruguayans seem to 
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which you are 
not entitled 




taxes if you 
have a chance 
Someone 
accepting a bribe 
in the course of 
their duties 
  1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005  1995  2005 
Never 
justifiable 
77.66 60.57 71.38 55.52 80.37 68.62  90.95  74.52 
2  4.82 8.74 3.46 8.41 3.17  8.7  2.95  7.58 
3  5.12 5.59 3.97 7.09 3.78 5.16  1.73  4.04 
4  2.36 4.07 3.46 4.76 2.35 4.45  0.92  2.53 
5 4.71  9.76  8.45  10.54  4.81  6.07  1.53  5.36 
6  1.13 5.28 1.83 4.66 1.33 3.54  0.51  2.22 
7  0.51 2.34 1.22 3.04 1.23 1.82  0.20  2.22 
8  0.82 1.22 1.32 2.03 0.61 0.61  0.31  0.61 
9  0.20 0.81 0.61 0.91 0.41 0.51  0.20  0.51 
Always 
justifiable 
2.66 1.63 4.28 3.04 1.94 0.51  0.71  0.4 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100  100  100 
Note: values in percentage 
 






MAN   1 if respondent is a man  0.41  0.44 
AGE Respondents´  age  46.35  46.53 
INCOMPLETE 
SECONDARY 
1 if respondent has not finished secondary 





1 if respondent finished secondary education  0.09  0.13 
UNIVERSITY  1 if having an university degree  0.07  0.13 
NO CHILDREN   1 if respondent has no children  0.24  0.24 
ONE CHILD  1 if respondent has a child  0.17  0.18 
TWO CHILDREN  1 if respondent has two children  0.28  0.27 
THREE CHILDREN  1 if respondent has three children  0.15  0.15 
MARRIED  1 if respondent is married or living as married  0.61  0.57 
DIVORCED  1 if respondent is divorced  0.07  0.07 
SEPARATED  1 if respondent is separated  0.04  0.02 
WIDOWER  1 if respondent is widower  0.10  0.11 
GOD 




1 if attending to religious services at least 
once a week 
0.13 0.12 
MONTEVIDEO  1 if living in Montevideo  0.50  0.43 
FULL TIME  1 if working full-time  0.33  0.30 
UNEMPLOYED  1 if being unemployed  0.06  0.10 
INCOME 
Satisfaction with current economic situation 








1 if respondent’s political affiliation is the 
center 
0.36 0.34 
PATRIOTISM  1 if respondent is proud of Uruguay  3.67  3.70 
 































AGE -0.011  -0.016  -0.008    -0.005 
COMPLETE 
SECONDARY 
-0.254 -0.459    -0.193 -0.165 
UNIVERSITY -0.405  -0.489  -0.293  -0.384  -0.261 
MARRIED -0.228  -0.564      -0.159 
WIDOWER   -0.799      -0.240 
ONE CHILD      0.244     
ATTENDANCE -0.275  -0.274  -0.277    -0.152 
FULL TIME  -0.289  -0.230      -0.121 
INCOME 0.045    0.069  0.067  0.037 
PATRIOTISM -0.216  -0.204  -0.465  -0.212  0.191 
CENTER 0.210    0.227  0.140  0.122 
MONTEVIDEO -0.162      -0.242  -0.119 
YEAR 2005  0.560  0.399  0.263  0.504  0.293 
Observations 1069  1069  1069  1069  1069 
     Note: only significant variables are presented. 
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